DePaul Journal of Health Care Law
Volume 1
Issue 2 Winter 1996

Article 2

November 2015

Suspect Financial Arrangements Between Hospitals and HospitalBased Physicians
Daniel Melvin

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl

Recommended Citation
Daniel Melvin, Suspect Financial Arrangements Between Hospitals and Hospital-Based Physicians, 1
DePaul J. Health Care L. 183 (1996)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol1/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It has
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

SUSPECT FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND
HOSPITAL-BASED PHYSICIANS
Danielffelvin"

INTRODUCTION
Hospital-based physicians such as anesthesiologists, radiologists and
pathologists naturally covet exclusive independent contracts with
hospitals. Such contracts ensure access to a stream of patients referred by
other physicians on the hospital's medical staff and consequently,
competition is fierce.
Some hospitals have been accused of exploiting this situation by
extracting economic benefits from hospital-based physicians or their
group practices -- a quid pro quo for the exclusive contract with the

hospital. The Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and
Human Services (OIG) has cited the following examples:
A hospital furnishes no, or token, reimbursement to
pathologists for professional services to the hospital (Part A
services) in return for the pathologists' opportunity to provide
professional services to patients and bill Medicare for those
services under Part B.
"

Radiologists are required to pay 50 percent of their gross
receipts to a facility's endowment fund.
A radiology group is required to allocate 33 percent of its
profits exceeding a set amount to the hospital for capital
improvements, equipment and other hospital expenditures.

*Associate,Kamensky &Rubinstein, Chicago, IL. B.A., Azusa Pacific University; 197S; M.A,
Fuller Theological Seminary, 1981; J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 1995.
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A radiology group is required to purchase radiology equipment
and donate the equipment to the hospital upon termination of
the contract for any reason.'
These reported arrangements raise the issue of whether hospitalbased physicians are in fact solicited by hospitals in return for referring
Medicare and Medicaid business in violation of the anti-kickback
provisions of Title 11 of the Social Security Act (the Anti-Kickback
Statute)3 Further, the form of these payments raises the issue of whether
the payments violate state laws prohibiting physicians from dividing fees?
This article first reviews pertinent provisions of the Anti-Kickback
Statute and discusses enforcement agency statements mad judicial
decisions relating to the question of financial relationships between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians. Next, this article considers the
impact of state physician fee-splitting prohibitions on such financial
arrangements. Finally, the enforceability of illegal arrangements between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians is considered.
THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
The Anti-Kickback Statute contains a two-part prohibition. First, the
statute prohibits anyone from knowingly and willfully soliciting or
receiving any remuneration in return for referring an individual to a person
for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service
reimbursable under Medicare or Medicaid. Similarly, the statute prohibits
receiving any remuneration in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering or
arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing or ordering any good,
facility, service or item reimbursable under Medicare or Medicaid. 4
I

OIG, Management Advisory Report No. OEI-09-89-00330, reprinted in Medicare and

Medicaid Guide (CCII) at 39,669 [hereinafter MAR]. The author is aware of one hospital-based
group that was asked to set aside a percentage of its receipts to fund research and subsidize the
compensation of hospital staff in the department.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (1995), as amended by Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, _ Stat. _ (codified as amended at__
U.S.C. §__).
3 See, e.g., 225 JLCS 60122(14), as amended by Pub. Act. 89-201 § 5 (prohibiting fee-splitting
by Illinois physicians).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1995).
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Second, the statute prohibits anyone from knowingly and willfully
offering or paying any remuneration to induce another person to make a
referral for the furnishing or arranging for the funishing of any item or
service reimbursable under Medicare or Medicaid. Similarly, the statute
prohibits any remuneration to induce the purchasing, leasing, ordering, or
arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service or item reimbursable under Medicare or Medicaid. For
the Purposes of the Anti-Kickback Statute, "remuneration!' means
remuneration paid or received directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly,
in cash or in kind.
Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute is a felony, and a criminal
conviction may result in a fine of not more than $25,000, imprisonment
for up to five years, or both.6 Further, the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has the authority to exclude from
participation in all federal health programs any individual or entity that the
Secretary determines has violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.7
There are five statutory exceptions to the ban on paying remuneration
in return for or to induce Medicare and Medicaid referrals:
(1) payments to bona fide employees;
(2) discounts or other price reductions that are properly disclosed in cost
reports;
(3) rebates paid to group purchasing agents from vendors, provided all
discounts are reported to the provider and reflected in cost reports;
(4) waiver of coinsurance payments under Medicare Part B under certain
conditions; and
(5) remuneration beteen certain managed care organizations and
individuals or entities pursuant to qualifying risk-sharing
8
arrangements.
In addition, the OIG has promulgated "safe harbor" regulations
delineating financial arrangements that will not be subject to criminal
5 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
6 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (2).
7 Id. § 1320a-7(b)(7).
8 Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3).
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prosecution or serve as a basis for exclusion from the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. 9 However, the statutory exceptions and "safe
harbors" do not apply to the types of financial arrangements between
hospital-based physicians and hospitals discussed here.
OIG MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT
On January 31, 1991, the OIG issued a Management Advisory Report
(MAR) to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the
agency responsible for administering the Medicare program, on the
subject of financial arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based
physicians."0 The MAR alerted HCFA to potential violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute arising -from certain financial arrangements
between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. Specifically, the OIG
found that hospitals materially influence the flow of Medicare and
Medicaid patients to hospital-based physicians. Therefore, arrangements
that require hospital-based physicians to split their revenues with
hospitals, or make payments to the hospitals in excess of the. fair market
value of the services or items provided by the hospital, are suspect,
although notper se violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute.The OIG based its conclusion in part on dictum in United States v.
Lpkis, a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. - In Lplis, the
court described an arrangement between a medical management
company and a clinical laboratory. The management company received
20 percent of the clinical laboratory's revenues derived from business
generated by the management company, which it alleged was "fair
compensation for specimen collection and handling services."13
However, upon review, the court observed that the fair market value of
these services was substantially less than the compensation paid to the

at

9 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1995) as amendedby 61 Fed. Reg. 2,122 (1996) (to be codified
C.F.R.§ ._ (setting forth 13 "safe harbors").
1o MAR, supra note 1, at
1 Id. at 28, 416.
12 United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
13 Id. at 1449.
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management company "and there was no question that [the laboratory]
was paying for the referrals as well as the described services." 14
Applying the court's reasoning to financial arrangements between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians, the OIG concluded that an
inference can be drawn that illegal remuneration occurs when hospitalbased physicians are required to pay the hospital for personnel services,
space or equipment on terms other than fair market value.1s To
illustrate, the OIG cited reported instances of contracts requiring
hospital-based physicians to make payments to a hospital in excess of the
fair market value of the services funished by the hospital. The OIG
also considered specific instances where hospital-based physicians were
reportedly required to pay a percentage of their gross receipts to a
hospital's endowment fund or capital improvements fund. 16 The OIG
found that all such arrangements appear to violate the Anti-Kickback
17
Statute.
The OIG also concluded, without citing any evidence, that such
financial arrangements between a hospital and hospital-based physicians
can cause the very problems the Anti-Kickback Statute was intended to
address. For example, hospitals may award exclusive contracts to
physicians based on improper financial considerations rather than the
professional qualifications of the physicians. The prospect of
remuneration from physicians may also give the hospital an incentive to
adopt policies and practices that increase utilization of services
reimbursable under Medicare Part B. Furthermore, hospital-based
physicians may even be encouraged to increase utilization to offset
revenues diverted to the hospital.18
The American Hospital Association (AHA), upon review of the
initial draft of the MAR, flatly rejected the OIG's conclusion that
contracts with hospital-based physicians involve the "referral" of
patients. The ARA contended there is no evidence that payments from
hospital-based physicians to hospitals affect utilization or the volume of

Id.
Is MAR, supra note 1, at 28, 416.
16 Id.
14

17

Td.
IS Id. at 28, 416-17.

188

DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

[Vol. 1:183

business ultimately billed to Medicare.19 Moreover, the ABA argued
that HCFA has on a number of previous occasions recognized that
hospitals derive revenue from hospital-based physician services but has
never challenged such arrangements as violative of the Anti-Kickback
Statute. 0
In response to the AHA's comments, the OIG first conatended that
case law interpreting the Anti-Kickback Statute "makes it clear" that the
statute applies to those who can materially influence the flow (not just
the volume) of Medicare and Medicaid business.
Since hospitals
control which physicians will receive an exclusive contract with the
hospital, the OIG maintains that the hospital can materially affect the
flow of Medicare and Medicaid business to the hospital. 22
Second, the OIG contended that proof of over-utilization is not an
element of an Anti-Kickback Statute offense.23 In creating the statute,
Congress intended to address financial arrangements that have the
potential for causing over-utilization, assuming the potential exists
whenever a party pays remuneration for the referral of Medicare and
Medicaid business.24 Certain financial arrangements betwe.n hospitals
and hospital-based physicians, the OIG argued, can create incentives for
over-utilization, resulting in increased utilization by hospital-based
physicians and hospital policies that encourage utilization."
Furthermore, the OIG was not persuaded by the AHA's argument
that HCFA's long-time recognition that physician revenues sometimes
accrue to hospitals is dispositive.2 6 HCFA's pronouncements, the OI
pointed out, do not purport to address fraud and abuse concerns since

I- Letter from Paul C. Rettig, AHA, to Richard P. Kusserow, OIG, HHS 2-3 (Mar. 11, 1991)
(reprintedin MAR, Appendix B) (hereinafter AHA Letter); see also Letter from Richard J.
Pollack, ARA, to Richard P. Kusserow, OIG, HHS 1 (Sept. 6, 1991) (reprintedin MAR,
Appendix ]B) (responding to second and final draft of the MAR) (hereinafter Pcllack Letter).
20 AHA Letter, supra note 19, at 3-7.
21 Letter from Richard P. Kusserow, OIG, to Paul C. Rettig, AHA, 2 (May 20, 1991)
(reprintedin MAR, Appendix B) (citing United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental
Servs., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (lst Cir. 1989)).
22 Id.
23 Id. at3.
24 Id.
25

Id.

26 Id.
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enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute is primarily the OIG's
responsibility. Thus, the OIG found it was obligated to address financial
arrangements that have the potential to harm the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and beneficiaries. 7 Having rejected the AHA's arguments,
the OIG's final draft of the MAR reflected only minor revisions to the
original draft.
The final draft of the MAR also attaches as an appendix a letter
from the College of American Pathologists (CAP).2 8 CAP strongly
supports the MAR, and states that the report underscores the problem
of hospitals extracting remuneration from pathologists in the form of
free, or deeply discounted, clinical pathology services reimbursable to
the hospital under Medicare Part A in exchange for the pathologist's
"franchise" to provide and bill for anatomic pathology services.P The
3D
American College of Radiology has endorsed the MAR as well.
The OIG's report reflects the agency's enforcement policy and
therefore must be taken seriously. However, it is not law and thus in
order to properly address the issues raised by the MAR, it is necessary
to revisit the language of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the relevant
judicial decisions interpreting the statute.
JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND THE ANTI-KICKBACK
STATUTE
No federal court has directly addressed the anti-kickback issue raised by
financial arrangements between hospital-based physicians and hospitals.
However, federal courts have addressed two threshold questions of
statutory interpretation: the meaning of "knowingly and willfully" (the
"scienter issue"); and the meaning of "any remuneration" in the context
of remuneration to induce referrals (the "remuneration issue").

Id. at 4.
Letter from Loyd R. Wagner, M.D., College of American Pathologists to Richard P.
Kusserow, OIG, BHS (Feb. 22, 1991) (reprinted in Mar., Appendix C).
2

28

9

Id.

o H. Guy Collier & James H. Sneed, &clusive ContractsBetween Hospitalsand HospitalBased Physicians:Recent Developments in 1993 HEALTH LW HANDBOOK 99, 114 (Alice G.
Gosfield, ed. 1993).
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The Scienter Issue
The Anti-Kickback Statute sanctions anyone who "knowingly and
willfully" solicits, receives, offers or pays any remuneration barred by
the statute. The scienter issue was addressed in HanlesterNetvork v.
Shalala, which involved the appeal of a Health and Human Services
(HI-S) ruling excluding from Medicare the participants of three
laboratory joint ventures. 3 Hanlester Network was the general partner
in three laboratory joint ventures engaged in an investment marketing
plan that allowed physician-investors to profit indirectly from referrals
to one of the joint venture laboratories. 32 Each laboratory joint venture
entered into a management agreement with a reference laboratory, and
although approximately 85 to 90 percent of the physician-ordered tests
from the joint venture labs were performed by the reference laboratory,
the joint venture laboratories retained an appreciable percentage of the
net revenues. 3
Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision In Ratzlaf v.
United States,3 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed
"knowingly and willfully" as it appears in section 1128B(b)(2) of the
Anti-Kickback Statute to require knowledge that the Anti-Kickback
Statute prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals; and
conduct prohibited by the statute with the "specific intent to disobey the
law."35 This construction requires that the government prove the
defendant acted with knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful.
Based on its construction of the scienter standard, the court did not find
the individual appellants had developed and operated the laboratory
venture with the specific intent of disobeying the law but rather, that
they had believed the venture was lawful. 36 In addition, the court held
that HHS failed to prove the profitable arrangement with the reference

31Hanlester
32

33
34

35
36

Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1394-95.
Id. at 1395, 1401.
Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
Hanlester,51 F.3d at 1400.
Id. at 1401.
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laboratory was solicited by the appellants in return for referrals for
laboratory tests. 37
The OIG has been highly critical of the Hanlester court's
interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statute's scienter standard, and one
official has publicly stated that the OIG has no intention of following the
decision in other federal appellate circuits.3 8 However, in the absence
of a conflict in the federal appellate courts, the Solicitor General has
turned down the OIG's request that the government appeal the Hanlester
decision to the United States Supreme Court. 39
No court outside of the Ninth Circuit appears to have followed the
Hanlestercourt's interpretation of the scienter standard. In an opinion
and order responding to a physician's motion to dismiss a criminal
indictment filed by the federal government in United States v. Net{feld,
the United States District for the Southern District of Ohio rejected the
40
Hanlester court's construction of "kmowingly and willfully."
Analyzing the physician's claim that the Anti-Kickback Statute is
unconstitutionally vague, the court considered the statute's heightened
scienter standard and concluded that the Ratzlaf analysis relied upon by
the Ninth Circuit in Hanlestercould not be applied to the Anti-Kickback
Statute. The court gave two reasons for its conclusion: the language
and legislative history of the Anti-Kickback Statute does not support a
definition of "willful" requiring knowledge of illegality; and the
inherent unlawfulness of the conduct prohibited by the statute militated
4
against a standard of "willfuness" requiring kmowledge of illegality. '
In Neulfeld, the court noted that Congress evinced an intent not to
subject inadvertent violations of the statute to criminal prosecution.
However, the court concluded that a concern for prosecuting inadvertent
violations of the statute does not "mandate the availability of a defense
of ignorance of the law." 42 Nevertheless, the court declined to enunciate
7

Id.

Lead Report- Fraudand Abuse, Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4 at 90 (Tune 15, 1995)
(quoting remarks by D. McCarty Thornton, Chief Counsel, OIG,HHS before the Annual
Meeting of the National Health Lawyers Association).
38

*.9NHLA,

No Supreme CourtAppeal in Hanlester Case, 24 NEWS RErO.tT 6 (996).
United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
41Id. at496.
41

42Id.
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an exact definition of the scienter requirement, holding only that the
statute's heightened scienter requirement was sufficient to withstand the
physician's claim that the Anti-Kickback Statute is unconstitutionally
vague. 43
In United States v. Jain, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
distinguished Hanlester.4 The court observed that the Hanlestercase
involved review of an administrative proceeding and that the Hanlester
court had adopted the heightened scienter standard in Ratzlaf "without
considering any alternatives to the general rule."45 The "general rule,"
advanced by the federal government at trial and on appeal is that
"willfully" in a criminal statute "refers to consciousness of the act but
not to consciousness that the act is unlawful." 46
Appealing his conviction under the Anti-Kickback Statute for
"knowingly and willfully" receiving remuneration in return for referring
Medicare patients to an acute care psychiatric hospital, the defendant in
Jain argued that Ratziaf and Hanlestershould control the federal trial
court's instruction on the mens rea element. 47 At trial, the federal trial
court adopted a middle ground, instructing the jury that "the word
'willfully' means unjustifiably and wrongfully, known to be such by the
48
defendant."
The Eighth Circuit court agreed that the Anti-Kickback Statute
resembles the anti-structuring provisions of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 at issue in Ratzlaf, in that it potentially includes
conduct that is not "inevitably nefarious." 49

The court cited the

elaborate "safe harbor" regulations mandated by Congress as evidence
that the acts prohibited by the Anti-Kickback Statute are not obviously
evil or inherently bad.50 Only conduct that is "inevitably nefarious"
warrants the presumption that "anyone consciously engaging in it has
41 Id. at
4

497.

United States v. lain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996).

4.Id. (citing United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995)).

SJain, 93 F.3d at 441 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 209 (1991) (Scalia,
I. concurring)).
47 Jain, 93 F.3d at 440.

48 Id. (quoting the trial court's jury instructions).
41 Jain, 93 F.3d at 440 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146-48 (1994)).
50 Jain, 93 F.3d at 440.
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fair warning of a criminal violation." 5' Thus, the Jain court agreed that
a heightened scienter standard for the Anti-Kickback Statute is
appropriate. 52
The Jain court, however, rejected the Ratzlaf standard, observing
that the statute in Ratziaf criminalized a willful violation of another antistructuring statute. Since a person cannot "willfully" violate a statute
without knowing what the statute prohibits, the Supreme Court required
proof the defendant intentionally violated a "known legal duty."5 3 In
contrast, the court observed that the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits a
series of acts. 54 Consequently, the plain language of the statute and
respect for the traditional principle that ignorance of the law is no
defense, suggests that the scienter standard for the Anti-Kickback Statute
does not require proof the defendant knew that his conduct violated a
known legal duty, but rather, that the government is required only to
prove the defendant "knew that his conduct was wrongful. " s
If Neufeld and Jain are any indication, the judicial trend is to
interpret the scienter element of the Anti-Kickback Statute as requiring
the defendant to act with knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act.
While this is a higher standard than the general rule that consciousness
of the prohibited act is sufficient mens rea for criminal liability, this
standard does not require a showing that the defendant intentionally
violated a known legal duty.55
The Remuneration Issue
The argument has been made that reasonable remuneration paid for
services rendered or items furnished cannot, as a matter of law,

S Id.
5

Id.

Id. at 441 (citing Ratzl4f, 510 U.S. at 140-41).
s4 Jain, 93 F.3d at441.
5

5 Id.

5 Distinguishing the language of the statute at issue in Raztzaf from the "Imowing and willful"
language of the Anti-Kickback Statute, the District Court of Appeal of Florida also rejected the
Hanlester courtt s application of the Ratzlafanalysis to the Anti-Kickback Statute. Medical Dev.
Network v. Professional Respiratory CareiHome Medical Equip. Sens., 673 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
App. Ct. 1996).
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constitute remuneration to induce referrals in violation of the AntiKickback Statute. However, two leading federal appellate court
decisions have rejected this argument.
InUnited States v. Greber, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Anti-Kickback Statute is violated if even one purpose of a
payment is to induce referrals for services or items covered by Medicare
or Medicaid.? The "one purpose" rule means that it is not enough that
payments are intended, in part, or primarily, as remuneration for
services or items actually furnished. If even one purpose of a payment
is to induce referrals for Medicare or Medicaid business, the payment
is illegal.
In United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental
Service,58 the First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the criminal
convictions of a municipal hospital executive, an ambulance service and
its president and sole shareholder. The hospital executive, who had a
consulting relationship with the ambulance company for which he was
compensated, was instrumental in awarding an exclusive contract to the
ambulance service. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute and two counts of accepting
remuneration in return for referring Medicare business to the ambulance
company. The ambulance company and its president and sole
shareholder were both convicted of conspiring to violate the AntiKickback Statute and for paying remuneration to induce the referral of
Medicare business. 59
The defendants in Bay State Ambulance argued, inter alia, that
payments by the ambulance company to the hospital executive were
reasonable compensation for consulting services rendered and therefore,
as a matter of law, could not constitute illegal remuneration.' The
defendants contended that the trial judge had erred in not requiring the
government to prove either that the payments were not compensation for
services rendered or that the payments were of substantially greater

I United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985).
n United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
59 Id. at 22.
o Id. at 29.
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value than the services rendered. 6' The trial court's instruction, upheld
on appeal, provided that if the jury found the payments were made for
two or more purposes, the government must prove that the "primary
purpose" of the payments was to induce referrals of Medicare
business.62 Thus, consistent with Greber, the court adopted the view
that payment of reasonable remuneration for services rendered does not
preclude a finding that the remuneration was paid to induce referrals in

violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.63
REMUNERATION TO HOSPITALS IN RETURN
FOR REFERRALS TO HOSPITAL-BASED
PHYSICIANS

The only judicial decision applying the Anti-Kickback Statute to
financial arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians

is VirginiaRadiology Associates, P.C. v. CdpeperMemorialHospital.64
In this case, one of the plaintiffs, Virginia Radiology Associates, P.C.
(VRA), alleged that its contract to operate the radiology department of
the defendant-hospital was terminated wrongfully in violation of state
public policy. Specifically, VRA alleged the hospital terminated VRA's
exclusive contract in retaliation for VRA's refusal to renegotiate the
contract to include illegal terms. The hospital's new contract terms
required VRA to:
(i) make cash contributions towards the purchase of equipment for the
hospital's radiology department;
61 Id.

62 Id. at29-30.
I United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 30 (lst Cir.
1989) (citng United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
988 (1985) and United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979)
(rejecting argument, under prior statute which did not include "remuneration,' that fees for
legitimate services could not be illegal kickbacks). The court declined to reach tht question
whether the government need only prove that inducement to refer Medicare business was one
purpose of the payment holding only that the lower court'sprimarypurpose instruction was not
inconsistent with Congressional intent. Id.
6'Virginia Radiology Assoc., P.C. v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., No. 90L172, slip op. at
7-8 (4th Judicial Cir. Ct. Va. Dec. 29, 1995).
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(i)

contract with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the hospital for billing
services involving fees in excess of 12 percent of gross receipts; and
(iii) contract with another wholly-owned subsidiary of the hospital for
"practice management" services involving management fees in
excess of the fair market value of the services to be provided.6 5
VRA declined to accede to the hospital's new contract term,; because it
believed that such payments, especially the equipment fund contribution
and the practice management contract, would each constitute a violation
of the Anti-Kickback Statute."
At trial, after hearing the plaintiffs case-in-chief, the hospital rested
without putting forth a defense. The court granted VRA's motion for
summary judgment and sent the case to the jury on the question of
damages only, where the jury awarded VRA zero dollars, despite the fact
that VRA's evidence of damages in the amount of $2,996,973 was
unrebutted by the hospital. On VRA's post-trial motion for additur the
court awarded the radiology group $2,996,973 in damages 7 and agreed
with VRA's view of the law, concluding that:
when the hospital refers patients to the Radiology Department for
their services only upon condition that [sic the] hospital receives
money for "practice-management" services for which there is no
evidence of fair market value, or where cash contributions are
demanded for the purchase of equipment for the Radiology
Department which the hospital owns as a condition for referral
there is a violation of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, § 1320a-Tb.1
Thus, the court held the hospital's demands and retaliatory termination
of the radiology contract was a violation of public policy.
The hospital did not contradict or offer rebuttal of VRA's testimony
on the scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute and an expert's conclusion
that the practice management fees demanded by the hospital were not

6 Id. at 4.
66

Id.

67 Id. at23.
6s Id. at 12.
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commensurate with the fair market value of the services provided. 69 This
failure of the hospital partially explains why the court's opinion lacks a
detailed consideration of the legal and factual issues raised by the
hospital's actions under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
While not engaging in an overt analysis of the statutory language
that failure of the hospital found to be precise and unambiguous, the
court nevertheless resolved an interpretative issue - whether the award
of an exclusive contract to hospital-based physicians constitutes a
referral, purchase, lease, or order, or an arrangement for or
recommendation of a purchase, lease or order of services covered by
Medicare and Medicaid. If an exclusive contract with a hospital
constitutes none of these things, the Anti-Kickback Statute is not
implicated by any financial arrangement between the hospital and
hospital-based physician group awarded the exclusive contract. For
convenience, in the discussion in this article, the term "referral issue"
will be used and will be added to the discussion of the scienter and
remuneration issues as they apply to financial relationships between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians.
The Referral Issue
In its report on financial arrangements between hospitals and hospitalbased physicians, the OIG cites Bay State Ambulance for the proposition
that case law makes it clear that the Anti-Kickback Statute's
proscriptions apply to those who can materially influence the flow of
Medicare and Medicaid business. 70 Indeed, the defendants in Bay State
Ambulance did not contest the government's theory that the city hospital
could direct Medicare business to the defendant ambulance company
merely by awarding them an exclusive contract for the city's front-line
(911) ambulance service. The parties appear to have accepted without
argument that awarding the exclusive contract with the hospital
constituted a referral or an arrangement for the purchase of services
reimbursable under Medicare and Medicaid. Therefore, under Bay State
I Virginia Radiology Assoc., P.C. v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., No. 90L172, slip op. at
9 (4th Judicial Cir. C. Va. Dec. 29, 1995).
" MAR, supranote I, at 28, 415.
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Ambulance, payments to anyone for the purpose of affecting the
outcome of the contract bidding process violate the Anti-Kickback
Statute. 71
In Virginia Radiology, the court summarily concluded that "when
the hospital refers its patients to the Radiology Department for their
services only upon condition that [sic the] hospital xeceives"
remuneration from VRA, the Anti-Kickback Statute is violated. 72 It
should be noted, however, that the court understood the hospital did not
actually referpatients to the Radiology Department, but rather, arranged
for radiology services covered by Medicare and Medicaid to be
furnished. 73
Although the VirginiaRadiology court did not expressly state the
proposition, the case illustrates that the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits
not only "referrals" as that term is commonly understood, but also
arrangements and recommendations to purchase, lease or order any
good or service covered by Medicare and Medicaid. 74 A hospital
presumably arranges for the purchase or order of Medicare and
Medicaid-covered physician services when it installs a group of
physicians in a department of the hospital. Furthermore, a hospital's
award of an exclusive contract to a physician group may also be
characterized fairly as a recommendation since the hospital presumably
awards the contract, in significant part, out of concern for th- quality of
care in the department. Thus, when a hospital grants a physician group
an exclusive contract to furnish physicians' services in the hospital, the
Anti-Kickback Statute appears to be implicated.
7 United States v. Bay State Ambulance& Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 27 (Ist Cir.
1989) (stating that the parties stipulated that the ambulance company received approximately
$171,883 in Medicare funds for two years of the ambulance service contract with the hospital).
7 Virginia Radiology Assoc., P.C. v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., No. 90L172, slip op. at
12 (4th Judicial Cir. Ct. Va. Dec. 29, 1995).
'7 See id. (quoting a phrase from the Anti-Kickback Statute that seemingly emphasizes that
payment in return for arrangingfor the furnishing of any item or service covered by Medicare
and Medicaid is prohibited by the statute). A review of the entire clause from which the court
quotes suggests that the court misinterpreted the phrase or intended to quote the next clause in
the Anti-Kickback Statute which unambiguously prohibits payments "in return for... arranging
for... ordering any good, facility, service, or item" reimbursable under Medicare or Medicaid.
Compare 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) with § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied).
74 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B).
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The Scienter Issue
The Anti-Kickback Statute's heightened scienter standard requiring
proof the defendant "knowingly and willfully" engaged in the prohibited
conduct was not an issue in Virginia Radiology. However, it is
instructive to note that the hospital was "guided and counseled" by a
lawyer "who practiced specifically in health care law."75 Although
VRA declined to enter into the proposed arrangement on the advice of
counsel, the hospital's counsel appears not to have been persuaded of the
arrangement's illegality. Had there been a reasonable difference of legal
opinion as to whether the arrangement violated the Anti-Kickback
Statute, the hospital could have argued in their defense that, acting on
the advice of counsel, they did not act with intent to violate a known
legal duty. Therefore, under Hanlester,the hospital did not act with the
requisite intent.
However, even injurisdictions where the Hianlestercourt's scienter
standard is controlling, or followed, payments to hospitals by hospitalbased physicians are not likely to enjoy the same appearance of good
faith based on industry custom found to exist in Hanlester.76 The OIG's
report on payments to hospitals by hospital-based physicians, published
in January 1991, and the decision in VirginiaRadiology should deprive
most hospitals of an "ignorance of the law" defense when charged with
soliciting payments from hospital-based physicians.
The Remuneration Issue
The remuneration at issue in irginiaRadiology involved the purchase
of equipment for the hospital's radiology department and payment of
fees for practice management services.77 The court heard, and accepted
as credible, expert testimony that the management fee demanded by the
hospital was inconsistent with fair market value of the services to be

7 Wirginia Radiology, slip op. at 4.
76 See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.Sd 1390, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing that the

management services agreement at issue was a "relatively common practice in clinical laboratory

field.-)
77 Virginia Radiology, slip op. at 4.
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rendered.7"
Thus, the court concluded the hospital solicited
remuneration in return for referrals in violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute. 79

It should be noted, however, that Greberand Bay State Ambulance
both stand for the proposition that remuneration may have two purposes,
and if one purpose (Greber) or the primary purpose (Bay State
Ambulance) of the remuneration is to induce referrals of Medicare
business, the payment is illegal remuneration under the Anti-Kickback
Statute.80 Thus, even if the fee paid by VRA was consistent with the
fair market value of the practice management services furnished by the
hospital, the payment could still be illegal remuneration if even one
purpose of the payment was to remunerate the hospital for the exclusive
contract to staff the radiology department.
Consider for example the hospital's threat to cancel VRA's contract
if VRA did not contract with the hospital for billing services. The mere
fact that VRA may have eventually paid the hospital a negotiated amount
consistent with the fair market value of the billing services rendered
would not have changed the fact that the billing arrangement and the
fees generated thereby were solicited in return for (i.e., made a
condition of maintaining) the exclusive contract. Thus, remuneration
paid by a hospital-based physician group consistent with the fair market
value of services rendered by the hospital may still be illegal under both
GreberandBay State Ambulance if one purpose of the remuneration is
to obtain or maintain the exclusive contract with the hospital.
Accordingly, hospitals that foist billing, staff, or practice management
services on hospital-based physicians that do not request tae services,
risk violating the Anti-Kickback Statute even if the fees involved are
consistent with fair market value of the services rendered.

78

Id. at 9, 12-13.

7- Id. at

12.

1 United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985); United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 29-30 (1st Cir.
1989).
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THE BAN ON PHYSICIAN FEE-SPLMTfING
ARRANGEMENTS
Many states have enacted laws prohibiting physicians from splitting their
fees except in specified circumstances."' The scope of these statutes
varies from state to state, however, case law developments in Illinois
illustrate how such laws can bear directly on financial arrangements
between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. Section 22 of the
Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987 provides that the Department of
Professional Regulation may revoke, suspend, place on probationary
status, or take any other appropriate disciplinary action with respect to
the license of a physician for:
Dividing with anyone other than physicians with whom the licensee
practices in a partnership, Professional Association, limited liability
company, or MedieProfessional Corporation any fee, commission,
rebate or other form of compensation for any professional services
not actually and personally rendered.81
At least three contracts have been declared illegal and void under
Illinois law because they were found to violate the fee-splitting ban.8
Significantly, two of these cases involved an obligation by a physician
to split a percentage of collections from patient billings with a nonphysician. Although one case involved "fee-splitting" in the classical
sense of splitting a fee in exchange for patient referrals,,- the feesplitting in the other cases involved payment toward the purchase of a
medical practice,8 and the payment (in part) for legitimate practice
management services.8 5 In the later cases, the Illinois appellate court
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)oi); IDAHO CODE § 54-1814(8); 225 ILCS
60/22(14), as amended by Pub. Act. 89-201 § 5; N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509-a; OHO REv. CODE
§ 4731.22(B)(17); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-225(a); WIS. STAT. § 448.08(1).
82 225 ILCS 60/22(14), as amended by Pub. Act. 89-201 § 5.
83 See E & B Marketing Enterprises v. Ryan, 568 N.E.2d 339 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1991);
Lieberman &Kraff, M.D., S.C. v. Desnick, 614 N.E.2d 379 (1. App. 1 Dist. 1993); Practice
Management, Ltd. v. Schwartz, 628 N.E.2d 656 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1993).
4 E &B MarketingEnterprises,568 N.E.2d at 339.
85 Desnfck, 614 N.E.2d at 379.
6 Schwartz, 628 N.E.2d at 656.
81
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held that the fee-splitting ban is not limited to fee-splitting in the
classical sense, but rather, prohibits all fee-splitting arrangements not
specifically authorized by Section 22 of the Illinois Medical Practice
Act.' Thus, even if legitimate services are furnished to the physician
and the fee-splitting arrangement constitutes payment commensurate
with the fair market value of such services, fee-splitting is an improper
method of payment in Illinois.
State physician fee-splitting bans may implicale financial
arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians.
Arrangements whereby a hospital-based physician group splits a
percentage of gross or net revenues with a hospital in return for an
exclusive contract, may violate the state's physician fee-splitting ban,
because the arrangement amounts to payments in return for referrals the classical fee-splitting arrangement. However, the fee-splitting
arrangement may, as in Illinois, violate the state's fee-splitting ban even
if the arrangement constitutes payment commensurate with the fair
market value of services rendered by the hospital, e.g., practice
management services. Thus, a financial arrangement that complies with
the Anti-Kickback Statute may still be barred by a state's prohibition on
physician fee-splitting.
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ILLEGAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HOSPITALS
AND HOSPITAL-BASED PHYSICIANS
As Virginia Radiology illustrates, a financial arrangement between a
hospital and hospital-based physicians that is illegal may render the
contract between the parties unenforceable. s8 In VirginiaRadiology, the
illegality of the contract modifications demanded by the hospital barred
the hospital from enforcing the termination provisions of the contract
with the radiology group, which otherwise permitted the hospital to
7 Desnick, 614 N.E.2d at 381; Schwartz, 628 N.E.2d at 659.
1 Virginia Radiology Assoc., P.C. v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., Inc., No. S0L172, slip op.
at 13 (4th Judicial Cir. Va. Dec. 29, 1995). See generally, Michael W. P'eregrine et al.,

Hospital/PhysicianContractingandthe IllegalityDefense, 27 . HEALTH &HoSil. L. 129 (1994)

(discussing various grounds for asserting the "illegality defense" to enforcement of contracts
between hospitals and physicians).

1997]

SUSPECTFMNANC4L ARRANGEAMENT3

203

terminate the contract without cause upon sixty days written notice.0'
Federal courts have declined to enforce lease arrangements and "income
guarantee" repayment terms between hospitals and physicians where the
agreements were found to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.90
Similarly, courts have declined to enforce contracts that involved illegal
fee-splitting arrangements under state law.9 '
The illegality of the financial arrangement proposed by a hospital
may, as in VirginiaRadiology, afford a hospital-based physician group
a legal basis for rejecting demands that it subsidize the hospital's
operating and capital costs. However, an illegal arrangement may also
give the hospital an opportunity to avoid contractual obligations to a
hospital-based physician group, such as instances where a hospital has
been recently purchased by another hospital wishing to avoid a
contractual obligation to the physician group currently operating a
department of the hospital. 2 Thus, physicians and hospitals must not
only guard against potential criminal and administrative sanctions under
the Anti-Kickback Statute and, in the case of physicians, threats to their
medical license under state fee-splitting bans, they must also consider
the effect of financial arrangements on the enforceability of their
contracts with each other.
CONCLUSION
The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits hospitals from soliciting, and
hospital-based physician groups from paying remuneration in return for
exclusive contracts to staff and operate hospital departments. Hospitalbased physician groups may pay for the fair market value of services or
items that they receive voluntarily from the hospital, and invest

9 WrginiaRadiology, slip op. at 3.

90 See Polk County v. Peters, 800 F.Supp. 1451 (E.D.Tex. 1992) (refusing to enforce
"income guarantee" repayment terms); Vana v. Vista Hosp. Sys., 1993 WL 597402 at *1 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1993) (refusing to enforce lease agreement between physicians
and hospital).
91
E &B MarketingEnterprises, 568 N.E.2d at 339.
92 Cf. Vana, 1993 WL 597402 at *1(refusing to enforce lease agreement against hespital that

was successor in interest to hospital-lessor that originally entered into lease agreement with
physicians).
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voluntarily in the hospital and programs that benefit the hospital.
However, if such economic arrangements are in fact involuntary
subsidies of the hospital's operating and capital costs solicited by the
hospital in return for the exclusive contract with the hospital, the
arrangement violates the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Furthermore, paying the hospital a percentage of the physician's
gross or net revenues may violate state prohibitions on physician feesplitting because it involves the impermissible sharing of professional
fees with a lay entity. A state's fee-splitting ban may apply even if the
arrangement involves payments consistent with the fair market value of
the services rendered by the hospital.
Both hospitals and hospital-based physicians must also keep in mind
that agreements that include illegal remuneration or fee-splitting terms
are probably unenforceable.
Thus, parties must consider the
consequences of entering into an agreement that may someday prove
unenforceable.

